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Abstract
We examine recovery rates of defaulted bonds in the US corporate bond market, based on a
complete set of traded prices and volumes. A study of the trading microstructure around various
types of default events is provided. We document temporary price pressure with high trading
volumes on the default day and the following 30 days, and low trading activity thereafter. Based
on this analysis, we determine market-based recovery rates and quantify various liquidity measures.
We study the relation between the recovery rates and these measures, considering additionally a
comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, and macroeconomic variables.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of credit risk in the pricing of financial
contracts and emphasized the multifaceted nature of its key determinants: the probability of
default and the recovery rate in the event of default. Traditionally, credit risk modeling has been
focused on the probability of default, while the recovery rate has been set to parametric values
that do not necessarily recognize its potential cross-sectional and time-series variation. However,
the magnitude and variability of defaults during the crisis have emphasized the importance of
obtaining more precise estimates of recovery rates, and explaining their variation across issues
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and issuers. It is now intuitively understood that recovery rates are potentially driven by many
different factors: endogenous variables (such as specific characteristics of the assets involved and
of the firm and industry), or exogenous factors (such as overall macroeconomic conditions or
market liquidity). It is important, therefore, to document the determinants of this risk factor
and to analyze their interaction effects with other dimensions of default risk. This paper aims at
investigating these relationships at the issue and obligor levels for the US corporate bond market.
Most credit risk instruments, such as bonds and credit default swaps (CDS), trade over-the-
counter (OTC). This makes research in this area challenging, as traded prices and volumes for these
instruments cannot be observed directly from a central database. Therefore, most studies have to
rely, of necessity, on quotation or trade data from a particular dealer, leaving open the question of
whether the data are representative of the market as a whole. This is even more of a problem for
defaulted financial instruments, as their trading can often be infrequent, resulting in stale prices,
with some of the quotations or trades of individual dealers even being “off market.” In contrast,
the market for US corporate bonds is an ideal laboratory for this study, since detailed data on
prices and volumes are available from 2002 onwards in the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
(TRACE) database, maintained by the Financial Regulatory Authority (FINRA). This allows us
to analyze, for the first time, the prices and volumes of defaulted bonds based on a complete
set of transaction data, covering all trades following default events, for the period from 2002 to
2010. As a consequence, this microstructure analysis not only permits a reliable estimate of a
market-based recovery rate, but also provides an opportunity to study trading activity, and hence
liquidity, at different stages following default. We combine the TRACE data set with the Mergent
Fixed Income Securities Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database, which
allows us to consider a broad set of default events, capturing formal bankruptcy filings, distressed
exchanges, and downgrades to default status by rating agencies, representing payment defaults
and unlikely-to-pay events.
We make three contributions in this paper. First, we provide a detailed analysis of the mi-
crostructure of trading in defaulted bonds, working with a complete set of default events over
the most recent decade, offering crucial and interesting new insights. The study of market prices
and trading behavior around different default events is important as many institutional investors
are directly exposed to these post-default prices, e.g., because they have to immediately liquidate
their positions, deliver the bonds through the settlement of credit default swaps (CDS) positions,
or mark down the values of the defaulted bonds on their balance sheets. Furthermore, the exami-
nation of market prices provides us the opportunity to analyze all default events (including, e.g.,
distressed exchanges), and not only the outcomes of formal bankruptcy procedures, often known
only years after the actual filing dates. Overall, this analysis allows us to discuss trading activity
at different stages following default and to derive market-based estimates of recovery rates, which
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are of fundamental relevance to various market participants.1 Second, we quantify the liquidity
of defaulted bonds, applying different measures in our analysis, and explore the implications for
recovery risk, which turn out to be of particular importance, since defaulted bonds are potentially
illiquid. Consequently, we study to what extent changes in the underlying liquidity, following
default, account for the observed post-default price evolution, as default might induce pressure
on prices. Third, we analyze the resulting bond recovery rates, employing a broad set of explana-
tory variables in our regressions to capture various aspects of recovery risk originating from bond
characteristics, including bond covenants, firm fundamentals, and macroeconomic conditions, in
contrast to much of the previous literature in which the analysis has typically been more narrowly
focused.
Our analysis of recovery rates yields several distinct sets of findings. We examine the trading
activity of the defaulted bonds, as defined by traded prices and volumes, in a time window starting
90 days before and ending 90 days after the observed default event date. We find that, although the
price level is already rather low before the default event, the traded price falls significantly to its
lowest level on the default day itself, to around 35% of face value, on average. The price recovers,
in the first 30 days following default, to about 42% of face value and shows a less volatile evolution
thereafter.2 Furthermore, we find that the trading volume of a defaulted bond is relatively high
on the default event day, providing evidence of temporary sell-side pressure as prices are low.
This high level of trading activity dies down, within the first 30 days after default, to pre-default
levels. Thus, this time window apparently represents the relevant trading period following default
in which investors split up and sell larger positions in defaulted bonds. Based on these findings,
we define the recovery rate of a defaulted bond as the average daily traded price per unit of face
value, over the default day and the following 30 days, covering the phase of high trading activity,
as we conjecture that price evolution in this time window is mostly driven by the default event
itself.
We analyze these recovery rates across bonds along various dimensions. First, we analyze
them across different default event types, revealing that distressed exchanges have the highest
recovery rates, whereas bankruptcy filings show significantly lower recoveries. This finding provides
further evidence that bondholders are confronted with lower recoveries in formal legal procedures
compared to in out-of-court restructurings. Second, we find significant differences in recoveries
between the default grades of the major rating agencies, which represent payment defaults and
unlikely-to-pay events, respectively; in particular, the rating frameworks of Moody’s and Fitch
1These estimates should be contrasted with the ultimate recovery rates, which are based on the amounts paid
by the firm to its bondholders at the resolution of formal bankruptcy filings.
2Note that a 40% recovery rate, which was the point estimate provided by Altman and Kishore (1996) in an
early paper in this area, has been widely used in calibrations in academia and industry.
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seem to incorporate recovery rate information to a greater extent than that of Standard and
Poor’s.3 Third, we find that, among nonfinancial industries, utility and energy-related firms
recover the most in default, while retailers recover the least. Interestingly, among financial firms,
the banking and credit & financing industries recover the most in default, whereas the financial
services industry recovers the least. Fourth, in terms of seniority levels, we find, as expected,
that secured bonds recover more than unsecured and subordinated bonds. Fifth, we document
a substantial variation in recovery rates over time, e.g., quarterly moving averages between 20%
and 80% of face value, for the time period from 2002 to 2010.
In the main part of our analysis, we employ regression models to explain the variation in recov-
ery rates, using a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, balance sheet ratios, macroeconomic
variables, and liquidity measures (in addition to dummy variables, based on the default event type,
industry, and seniority). Overall, our regression analysis explains 66% of the total variation in
recovery rates, with all four groups of variables contributing to the explanatory power. We demon-
strate a clear link between the defined bond-specific liquidity measures and their recovery rates.
In particular, when measuring the transaction costs of trading using the price dispersion measure,
we document that illiquid bonds with high transaction costs recover less following default.
Analyzing bond characteristics, we find that bonds that can be delivered into a CDS contract
have a significantly higher recovery rate, possibly because of increased demand from protection
buyers, who are required to physically deliver the underlying bond. In addition, we find that bond
covenants significantly affect the level of the recovery rate. In particular, investment and financing
covenants that provide protection for existing bondholders against potential adverse firm actions
are important determinants. That is, restrictions on the investment and financing policy are an
effective tool that creditors can use to increase their recovery rates.
As for the other firm characteristics, among balance sheet ratios, we find significant effects for
those ratios that are motivated by structural credit risk models, i.e., the higher is the equity ratio,
and the lower the default barrier, the higher will be the recovery rate. Analyzing macroeconomic
variables reveals a particularly strong effect for the market-wide and industry-specific default
rates. Thus, a high default rate in the market as a whole, a systematic risk factor, or a high
industry-specific default rate, as an indicator of industry distress, are all linked to significantly
lower recovery rates for individual bonds, following default. Along the same lines, we find a positive
relation between short-term interest rates, an indicator of the business cycle, and recovery rates.
In an additional analysis, we explore the cross-sectional price properties of later post-default
3Note that the rating frameworks of Moody’s and Fitch focus on the expected loss, (see
Moody’s Investors Service, 2002; FitchRatings, 2013), which involves both the probability of default and the recov-
ery rate given default. In contrast, Standard and Poor’s ostensibly considers only the probability of default in its
ratings (see Standard & Poor’s, 2011).
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periods to test whether our results depend on the particular time window chosen for the recovery
rate estimation: We show that all determinants consistently explain prices within the first 90
days after default. Moreover, we find that trading activity (volume and number of trades) are
important additional measures of liquidity, and explain cross-sectional differences in prices, once
the sell-side pressure subsides and trading activity drops back to pre-default levels. Hence, in order
to further elaborate on the importance of liquidity in default, we present evidence showing that
changes in trading activity and transaction cost measures of liquidity can indeed explain observed
price changes, across different post-default periods.
Overall, we provide a comprehensive analysis, going beyond the results that have been pre-
sented in the prior literature. We study the microstructure of trading activity and offer detailed
insights into the stochastic nature and drivers of recovery rates by analyzing a broad set of ex-
planatory variables rather than only providing evidence on the effects of any one factor. Our
results on the effects of liquidity are particularly noteworthy, since our paper is the first, to our
knowledge, to report findings on the effects of liquidity on recovery rates. The paper is organized
as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 provides details of the data used in our anal-
ysis. Section 4 states the main hypotheses tested and the research questions addressed. Section
5 presents the methodology and explains the setup of the subsequent analysis. Section 6 provides
the descriptive analysis and the results of the regression models. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
The literature on recovery rates can be divided into two categories: theoretical papers dealing
with credit risk models, which make implicit or explicit assumptions about recoveries in default,
and empirical papers analyzing past default events. Traditionally, credit risk models have been
divided into structural and reduced-form models see, e.g., Altman et al. (2002) for a detailed
discussion. In the basic structural models, starting with Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1974), the default risk of a firm is driven by the process generating the value of its assets; hence,
the risk of the firm’s default is explicitly linked to the volatility of its asset value. Default occurs
when the value of a firm’s assets is lower than that of its liabilities at maturity. In this case,
the debtholders receive the residual market value of the firm’s assets. Hence, in this setup, the
recovery rate, as the residual value of the defaulted company’s assets, is an endogenous variable
that is inversely related to the probability of default. This relation becomes even more evident
when structural models are used as the basis for credit portfolio analysis (see, e.g., Frye, 2000;
Gordy, 2003), where asset values are modeled by market-wide factors and idiosyncratic factors,
with market factors leading to a negative relation between aggregate default and recovery rates.
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Several authors provide extensions to the basic Merton (1974) model.4 They generally assume
that default may occur at any time between the issuance and maturity of the debt, that default is
triggered when the value of the firm’s assets reaches a lower threshold barrier, or that bankruptcy
costs arise exogenously. Interestingly, in most of these models, the recovery rate is assumed to be
exogenous or independent of the firm’s asset value. It is generally defined as a fixed proportion of
the outstanding debt value, in terms of either face or market value, and is, therefore, independent
of the probability of default.
Reduced-form models of credit risk do not condition default on the structural features of the
firm (see, e.g., Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995; Duffie and Singleton, 1997; Lando, 1998). Rather,
these models allow separate, explicit assumptions to be made regarding the dynamics of both
the probability of default and the recovery rate. Although, in principle, a complex dependence
structure can be used in such models, the recovery rate is usually assumed to be exogenous, either
deterministic or stochastic, and often independent of the default probability.
It has been well documented that neither reduced-form models (see, e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005)
nor structural models (see, e.g., Huang and Huang, 2012) can fully explain observed yield spreads
satisfactorily. It is relevant, therefore, to try to understand the stochastic nature of recovery rates
and provide evidence from past defaults, to improve the modeling of default. During the last two
decades, direct attempts have been undertaken to empirically investigate the behavior of recovery
rates. An important first analysis is provided by Altman and Kishore (1996), who use a data set
of over 700 defaulted bond issues from 1978 to 1995, focusing on the recovery experience on the
default day based on quoted prices. They analyze the effect of industry affiliation on recovery rates,
and conclude that the highest average recoveries come from public utilities (70%) and chemical,
petroleum, and related products (63%), and that the original rating of a bond has virtually no
effect on recovery, once seniority is accounted for. Hanson and Schuermann (2004) provide similar
evidence for the impact of seniority and industry affiliation, based on an analysis of a sample of
around 2, 000 defaults of bonds and loans. Furthermore, they study the empirical distribution
of recovery rates and provide evidence that recoveries are lower in recessions. Along the same
lines, Altman et al. (2005) analyze the relationship at a macroeconomic level, and conclude that
the average annual recovery rates and default rates are indeed negatively correlated. They show
that realized default rates in a particular year are important drivers of recoveries, whereas other
macroeconomic variables, such as the gross domestic product (GDP) or the GDP growth rate, i.e.,
the performance of the economy, are less predictive than most theoretical papers would suggest.
Acharya et al. (2007) provide a detailed analysis of industry-wide distress and its relation to
4Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Goldstein et al. (2001), and
Acharya et al. (2006) are examples of such analyses.
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recovery rates at default. They argue that, when an industry is in distress, defaulting firms in
the industry experience lower recoveries. One mechanism causing this effect is the lower ability of
the distressed firm to sell assets to competitors in the same industry, as discussed in Shleifer and
Vishny (1992). Using a data set from 1982 to 1999, with about 800 observations, they provide
evidence that defaulted debt in industries in distress recovers 10% to 15% less on average. They
also document a negative effect of aggregate default rates on the recovery rates of individual issues
and provide some evidence that balance sheet ratios are of importance.
Analyzing the default event type, Bris et al. (2006) and Davydenko and Franks (2008) provide
evidence that differences in creditors’ rights and reorganization practices are reflected in the level of
recovery rates at the time of default resolution. They compare defaults across different bankrupcty
procedures, e.g., Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 filings, as well as across different countries or
jurisdictions. Altman and Karlin (2009) provide further evidence of the importance of the default
event in discussing distressed exchanges. They find that, in distressed exchanges, recoveries at
default are higher than in the case of other default events. Altman and Kalotay (2014) provide
further evidence of industry-driven effects, focusing on the modeling of the distribution of recovery
rates for defaulted loans and bonds.5 Interestingly, their results are based on ultimate recoveries,
i.e., the recovery at the resolution of the default, rather than the traded prices immediately
following default.
Our paper extends the existing literature in new and important directions and provides detailed
empirical evidence on the driving factors of recovery rates, covering a complete set of default
events. Reviewing this literature, the analysis provided by Acharya et al. (2007) is the closest to
ours. However, there are crucial differences between that paper and ours, which generally apply
to the comparison of our paper with all other prior studies as well. First, Acharya et al. (2007)
employ a rough proxy for the recovery rate since they use the prices of the securities at the time of
emergence from default (which can be several years after the actual bankruptcy filing) and discount
them to the time of default using a high-yield bond index. As a consequence, they cannot rely
on detailed and accurate market microstructure data at the time of default as presented in this
paper, which could influence their results. This shortcoming is basically common to all other prior
studies, which have to rely on (rough) proxies for the recovery rates as well, and mostly employ
price/quotation information at one point in time without being able to assess possible alternatives
directly related to the market information at the time of default. Second, our setup allows us to
directly address the liquidity of defaulted securities, for the first time. Third, we make use of a
far more comprehensive list of instrument- and firm-specific variables and analyze a broader set
5See Altman et al. (2010) for a further discussion of the differences between the recovery rates of loans and
bonds.
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of default events. Therefore, we can provide a particularly detailed analysis of the determinants
of recovery rates going beyond the scope of the presented literature.
3. Data
This paper relies on several data sources that we combine to analyze recovery rates in the US
corporate bond market. First, we identify the default events by type, using the Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database and NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database. These databases
provide detailed information on all Chapter 11 filings, distressed exchanges, and downgrades to a
default rating grade.6 These events cover virtually the whole spectrum of default scenarios, i.e.,
formal bankruptcy filings to informal unlikely-to-pay events. Overall, we observe 1, 270 default
events for 534 firms for the time period from July 2002 to October 2010.7 Table 1 presents the list
of event types and their definitions. The first type of default event consists of Chapter 11 filings,
representing formal bankruptcy procedures handled by federal courts; i.e., when a firm is unable
to service its debt or repay its creditors, then it or its creditors can file with a federal bankruptcy
court for protection under Chapter 11. A trustee can act as debtor in possession, and thus operate
the business. Chapter 11 filings can be used to restructure the debt or liquidate the assets. The
second type of default event comprises distressed exchanges, in which the debtor attempts to avoid
formal bankruptcy by proposing a fundamental change in the existing contractual commitments to
its creditors. Thus, the creditors can voluntarily agree to avoid the potential costs that might arise
in a formal restructuring. Distressed exchanges have become popular in recent years, particularly
since the financial crisis. The third type consists of payment defaults and unlikely-to-pay events,
represented by ratings downgrades. We retrieve ratings from Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and
Fitch. Ratings rank the obligor according to creditworthiness (AAA, AA, . . . , C, D), with the
rating agencies providing differentiated default classes. The worst rating grade (e.g., D) indicates
an actual default (payment default on a financial commitment). The second worst rating grade
(e.g., C) is meant for highly speculative obligations that are considered unlikely-to-pay. Under
many regulations, this stage is already considered a default event (see, e.g., the definitions of
default in the US regulation implementing Basel II).
6We exclude Chapter 7 and 15 filings, as these events represent less than 1% of all defaulted firms, which have
outstanding traded corporate bonds. Furthermore, we find extremely infrequent trading activity for most of these
bonds and, usually, no trading activity after the default event. This is not suprising as Chapter 7 filings are often
used by small and medium-sized enterprises, which are not very active on the corporate bond market, and Chapter
15 is ancillary to a primary proceeding brought in another country, and not often applied, as domestic bankruptcy
cases can be filed directly.
7Note that firms can be involved in multiple default events, as firms can default more than once in several years
or because, e.g., defaults on payments can trigger multiple types of default events. To control for this possibility,
we tested various alternative specifications in our empirical analysis, excluding overlapping events, e.g., using only
the first default event per firm or employing only the most severe event. However, the qualitative nature of the
results was very similar.
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The second important data set we use is obtained from the TRACE database maintained by
FINRA, which provides transaction information such as prices and volumes for the whole universe
of US corporate bonds.8 In the US corporate bond market, reporting to TRACE is obligatory
for broker-dealers for all transactions, and follows a set of rules approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), whereby all transactions must be reported within a time frame
of 15 minutes. This data source is rather unique for an OTC market since, in almost all other
cases, price information must usually be obtained either from an individual dealer’s trading book,
which provides a very limited view of the market, or by using bid-ask quotations. We implement
standard filters to exclude potential errors in TRACE.9
We match the default events with the transaction data of the individual bonds affected by
the respective event, within the time window starting 90 days before default, and ending 90 days
after the default event. However, some minimum requirements must be fulfilled in order for a
bond to be included in our analysis. For each bond, we must observe at least 15 trades in each
of the two time windows covering the periods of 90 days before and after default.10 Also, we
exclude from our sample bonds with an amount issued smaller than $10 million, as well as bonds
with complex structures, mostly related to embedded derivative features. The prices in default of
bonds with such payoff structures may be quite different, and could potentially bias the analysis.
In particular, therefore, we drop bonds that are rating-sensitive, convertible, sinkable, extendible,
structured, or that possess any other kind of complex optionality. Thus, the bonds included in
our analysis are either straight bonds, or simply puttable or callable.11 Matching the TRACE
data set with the default events results in 2, 235 event/bond combinations (1, 090 for nonfinancial
firms and 1, 145 for financial firms), covering 818 bonds issued by 259 firms, and accounting for
approximately 1, 734, 000 trades, with an aggregate volume of $500 billion.
We add bond data, firm characteristics, and macroeconomic data from Bloomberg, covering the
amount issued, maturity, coupon, industry and seniority level, as well as interest rate information
(US Federal Funds rate and Treasury yields), to assess the impact of overall economic conditions
on the level of recovery rates. We match the data set with data from Markit, which enables the
identification of bonds that can be delivered to settle CDS contracts following the default event.12
8The reported trade volume is capped at $1 million for high-yield and unrated bonds, and at $5 million for
investment-grade bonds. However, the exact trade volume is only released by FINRA after an 18-month delay.
9Dick-Nielsen (2009) provides an extensive description of possible reporting errors, and their implications for
liquidity analysis. Such errors include (i) trade corrections within the same day, (ii) trade cancellations within the
same day, and (iii) reversals across days, i.e., due to a mistake that was not detected on the trading day itself.
Furthermore, we implement price filters, eliminating potentially erroneous reported prices.
10Note that we compared our results with a subsample of high trading activity bonds, i.e., with at least 25
trades, and confirmed that our results are not driven by very illiquid bonds with low trading activity.
11We assume that simple call and put options do not affect the analysis, as call options are deeply out-of-the-
money in default, and put options offer no advantage as, basically, most default events trigger (cross-)acceleration
clauses. Indeed, we confirmed this, repeating our analysis using only straight bonds and finding essentially the
same results.
12Markit provides consensus valuations of CDS contracts across different maturities and restructuring clauses.
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Furthermore, we retrieve detailed covenant information on our bonds from the Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database. In addition, we match the data set to balance sheet and income
statement information obtained from Compustat. This permits us to analyze the effect of various
balance sheet ratios, which are motivated by several models for recovery rates.
4. Research questions and hypotheses
In this section, we discuss the research questions addressed and hypotheses tested in this
paper. In particular, we consider the underlying trading activity in defaulted bonds and focus on
the potential effects of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic indicators, and
liquidity measures on the level of recovery rates.
The microstructure of the trading activity in defaulted bonds allows us to analyze important
research questions relating to how bond prices, trading volumes, and the number of trades evolve
in different stages of default, and how a reliable market-based recovery rate can be estimated.
We examine the trading activity in the defaulted bonds from 90 days before to 90 days after the
observed default event date. In particular, we identify a “grace period” after the default event,
during which prices are mainly driven by the effects of the default event itself, and test whether
the trading activity levels are significantly different before and after this window. Furthermore, we
examine the trading microstructure of various subsamples based on industry, rating, and default
event type, and compare the trading activity in the defaulted bonds with that found in previous
studies of non-defaulted bonds. In the analysis, it turns out that, in a grace period of 30 days
following the default event, the trading activity is unique, indicating that the price evolution is
mainly driven by the default event itself (see Section 6).13
In the main part of our analysis, we explore cross-sectional variations in these recovery rates
along various dimensions. First, we focus on three aspects that have been found to be of importance
in the previous literature: default event type, industry, and seniority. Starting with the default
event type, we cover the full range of default events, from formal bankruptcy to informal unlikely-
to-pay events. We test the hypothesis that formal statutory procedures are a sign of more severe
economic problems within a firm and, thus, that bondholders are confronted with higher costs in
this case than in the case of informal procedures. Therefore, we anticipate finding lower recoveries
for Chapter 11 filings than for distressed exchanges and rating defaults. Furthermore, we expect
default ratings to have lower recoveries than unlikely-to-pay ratings. As for industry affiliation,
we would expect that, within nonfinancial industries, utility and energy firms should recover more
than firms in other industries, as reported by various studies (see Section 2), due to their higher
13Note that we also explore prices and price changes in later post-default periods to test whether our results
depend on the particular time window chosen; see Section 6.4.
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proportions of tangible assets. Similarly, among financial firms, commercial banks should recover
more than investment banks, possibly because of their larger holdings of liquid assets. As for the
seniority of the bonds, we hypothesize that, the greater the seniority and the collateral value of
their assets, the higher will be the recovery rate.
Going beyond these simple dimensions, we analyze the effects of bond characteristics, firm
fundamentals, macroeconomic variables, and liquidity variables on recovery rates. The potential
effects of bond characteristics, such as amount issued, maturity, coupon, rating grade one year
before default, CDS availability, and covenants (classified as investment, dividend, financing, and
event-related restrictions), on recovery rates pose some interesting research questions. In particu-
lar, we conjecture that larger bond issues will recover more, as bonds with larger amounts issued
are, in general, traded at higher prices (see, e.g., Friewald et al., 2012). We assume that bonds
with longer maturities will recover less since long-term bonds are often held by buy-and-hold in-
vestors, such as insurance companies, and are often sold in large blocks upon default. We expect
the coupon rate to be positively related to the recovery rate, since bonds with a higher coupon
would be of higher value under certain outcomes of the default event. This would be the case
if there was even a (small) positive likelihood of all contractual cash flows (including the higher
coupon) being fulfilled after the default event, e.g., after a successful reorganization. Regarding
the rating grade one year before default, we hypothesize that the lower is the rating grade, the
lower will be the recovery rate. This is motivated by the idea that the rating grades of agencies
might also reflect recovery risk. We expect to see a higher recovery rate if the bond is deliverable
into a CDS contract, as this type of bond may generate greater demand from protection buyers
upon default than would non-insurable bonds. Furthermore, we test whether covenants have an
impact on the level of recovery rates. We hypothesize that bonds carrying covenants will exhibit
higher recovery rates, as they might restrict firms from implementing certain policies, which could
expose existing bondholders to higher risks, e.g., risky investment policies, higher payouts, changes
in debt priority or control rights.
The characteristics of the firm will most certainly affect the level of the recovery rate. We
assume that the value of equity and the default barrier will impact recoveries, as suggested by
structural models of credit risk: The lower the market value of equity and the higher the default
barrier, the lower will be the recovery of the debtholders, given a particular drop in the firm’s
asset value triggering default. Furthermore, we test whether earnings, tangible assets, receivables,
and firm size positively affect the recovery rate.
Macroeconomic variables, such as market-wide default rates, industry-specific default rates,
and information based on interest rate curves, are generally expected to have a significant impact
on the level of recovery rates, as they are indicators of economic conditions. In particular, we
hypothesize that high market-wide and industry-specific default rates signal that the economic
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conditions are poor and, thus, could lead to lower recovery rates for individual firms. Similarly,
when (short-term) interest rates are low, the economy will be at the lower end of the business
cycle, with lower recovery rates. We also investigate the impact of the slope of the interest rate
term structure on recoveries.
Furthermore, our detailed data set allows us, for the first time, to study the liquidity of
defaulted bonds as an important additional aspect related to recovery risk. In particular, we
estimate liquidity proxies, such as trading activity variables (volume and number of trades) and
transaction cost measures (the Amihud measure and price dispersion measure), for the individual
bonds, and test the hypothesis that less liquid bonds have lower recovery rates. We expect that
the liquidity effects on prices that have been extensively documented in the literature on non-
defaulted bonds (see, e.g., Bao et al., 2011; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Friewald et al., 2012) will be
exacerbated following default. In addition, we analyze whether changes in the liquidity measures
can explain price changes between different post-default periods, assuming that the liquidity effects
account for a significant proportion of the price evolution after default.
5. Methodology
This section outlines the general approach taken to measure the determinants of recovery rates
in the US corporate bond market. We present, here, our definitions of the recovery rate and the
various types of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables and liquidity
measures that are used to explain the bond recovery rate (see Section 4). We also present the
regression setup that we use in our analysis.
5.1. Recovery rate
The recovery rate pi of a bond i, issued by firm j, is defined in our analysis as the mean of
the transaction prices p, per trade day and per $100 of face value, across the default day t and
the T = 30 days after default.14 If Ki,j,s is the number of trades of bond i, of firm j, on day s,
indexed by ki,j,s, then
pii,j,t =
1
T + 1
t+T∑
s=t
 1
Ki,j,s
∑
ki,j,s
ps,ki,j,s
 . (1)
Thus, this specification of the recovery rate suggests that the level of pii,j,t can be interpreted
as what an investor would have to pay or receive, on average, and hence in expectation, given
that a default event has occurred, and given that the transaction takes place within the time
14Additionally, we calculated the recovery of Treasury (instead of recovery of face value) for all our default
event/bond combinations, so as to compare the results to the presented specification. In general, these alternative
recovery rates are somewhat lower, as Treasury bond prices are often higher in crisis periods, when more defaults
occur. However, the qualitative nature of our subsequent results is not affected and, thus, we do not present the
results in detail.
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window starting on the default day and ending 30 days after default. It should be noted that the
accrued interest is set to zero, as most defaulted bonds are traded flat, i.e., without the exchange
of accrued interest; thus, all prices under investigation are “clean” rather than “dirty.” The
specification presented above represents a market-based definition of the recovery rate, in which
a certain grace period is considered. We will further elaborate on our definition, based on the
analysis of the trading microstructure in default, in Section 6.
5.2. Bond characteristics
We use a set of bond characteristics to explain differences in the recovery rates of corporate
bonds. The most basic information available about a bond consists of its amount issued, maturity,
and coupon. In addition, we consider the seniority level of the bond in question, which is, of course,
very important when analyzing recovery rates. Specifically, we use four different levels of seniority:
(i) guaranteed, (ii) secured, (iii) unsecured, and (iv) subordinated.15
Bond ratings from Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s, one year before the default events,
are retrieved and mapped to natural numbers, i.e., AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, . . . , D = 21. With these
data, we can analyze whether the rating grade before the default event is informative about the
recovery rate. In other words, we can compare “expected” and “unexpected” credit events.
We collect information about whether the bond is deliverable into a CDS contract and, hence,
is insurable in the CDS market. This is considered to be a bond-specific event, since only a selected
list of bonds in a particular firm can be delivered into its CDS contract. For example, if, for a
given firm, only CDS for unsecured debt are traded, then subordinated bonds cannot be insured.
Additionally, we analyze the effect of bond covenants on recovery rates. We retrieve detailed
covenant information for our entire sample of bonds from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database, containing 54 different restrictions in the bond indenture contracts. We follow the ap-
proach taken by Chava et al. (2010) to group bond covenants into four main categories (investment,
dividend, financing, and event), relying on the framework provided by Smith and Warner (1979).
The rationale for the grouping is based on the nature of the restriction imposed by the particu-
lar covenant. A bond is classified as carrying an investment covenant, if it contains restrictions
on investments, e.g., risky investments, mergers and acquisitions, or asset sales, while a dividend
covenant implies restrictions on payments to shareholders. A financing covenant restricts policies
on debt (stock) issuances, debt priority, or defines minimum (respectively, maximum) limits re-
garding earnings or indebtedness. Finally, an event covenant contains a change in control clause,
such as a poison put.
15Note that, for some bonds, the financial data vendors provide more granular classifications of seniority. How-
ever, the four classes listed above are important and relevant for all bonds, with such data generally being available
for almost all bonds.
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5.3. Firm fundamentals
We employ certain firm characteristics in our analysis. First, we use the industry in which the
firm operates as an important characteristic. Second, we use balance sheet and income statement
information as explanatory variables; these are available for the fiscal year prior to the default
event. We use the following six accounting ratios, which are directly motivated by structural credit
risk models (see Section 2):
Equity =
Market value of equity
Total assets
(2)
Default barrier =
Short-term debt + 12Long-term debt
Total assets
(3)
LTD issuance =
Long-term debt
Total debt
(4)
Profitability =
EBITDA
Total sales
(5)
Intangibility =
Intangible assets
Total assets
(6)
Receivables =
Total receivables
Total assets
(7)
We use the value of equity over total assets as a general indicator of the financial condition of the
firm.16 The value of equity is used in many structural credit risk models to infer the asset value
of the company and also to define the leverage. Furthermore, we use the default barrier as defined
by Moody’s Analytics (previously known as Moody’s KMV), which is widely used in structural
credit risk modeling, i.e., in assessing the distance to default measure of firms. In addition, we
define LTD issuance as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, since long-term debt is regarded
as a more stable funding source, and less likely to cause default in the short run.17 We measure
profitability using the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA),
motivated by structural models based on cash flows. In addition, we analyze intangible assets and
receivables over total assets. Finally, we use total assets and number of employees as size proxies
for firms.18
16In a few cases, we replaced the market value of equity with the book value of equity, when reliable data were
not available for the former.
17Note that we also analyzed the debt structure of the firm based on the debt priority, i.e., we measured the
percentages of secured, unsecured, and subordinated debt. However, these debt structure variables turned out to
be insignificant in our analysis and, therefore, are not presented in detail here.
18Note that many of these characteristics are regularly used in credit scoring models as well, e.g., in Altman’s
Z -Score model (see Altman, 1968).
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5.4. Macroeconomic variables
We consider four different macroeconomic indicators: the market-wide default rate, the industry-
specific default rate, the Federal Funds rate, and the slope of the term structure of interest rates.
The market-wide default rate is an indicator of overall financial distress in the corporate bond
market, while the industry-specific default rate is an indicator of industry-wide distress (see also
Acharya et al., 2007). The Federal Funds rate and the slope of the term structure are indicators
of the state of the business cycle. We define the default rate, for a default event at time t, as the
ratio of defaulted bonds to total outstanding bonds, in the whole US corporate bond market, or
in the respective industry, in the time interval from T = 90 days before day t to day t.
Default ratet =
Defaulted bondst,t−T
Outstanding bondst,t−T
. (8)
In addition, we consider the Federal Funds rate on the default event day as the relevant short-
term interest rate, to avoid issues of default risk and illiquidity, particularly after the financial
crisis. We define the slope of the yield curve on the default event day as the difference between
the Federal Funds rate and the ten-year US Treasury yield.19
5.5. Liquidity proxies
We define various liquidity proxies, which we use as additional explanatory variables. We
employ simple trading activity variables, e.g., the volume and number of trades, and more sophis-
ticated liquidity measures, e.g., the Amihud and price dispersion measures, which have been used
in the literature (see, e.g., Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Friewald et al., 2012). We estimate these
measures in the time window from the default day t to T = 30 days after t.
Volume
The volume variable, vi,j,t, is the average transaction volume per trading day, of bond i of firm
j, across the period from the default day t to T = 30 days after t:
vi,j,t =
1
T + 1
t+T∑
s=t
 1
Ki,j,s
∑
ki,j,s
vs,ki,j,s
 . (9)
19We tried using alternative measures of the short-term interest rate, such as the Treasury bill yield and the
London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), and the slope of the term structure as explanatory variables. However,
the results were basically similar, and here we report only the results of using the definitions given above.
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Number of trades
This variable, ni,j,t, is the average number of trades of bond i of firm j, per trading day, across
the period from the default day t to T = 30 days after t:
ni,j,t =
1
T + 1
t+T∑
s=t
Ki,j,s. (10)
Amihud measure
The Amihud measure (see Amihud, 2002) measure of bond i of firm j, on day s, given Ni,j,s
observed returns r on this day indexed by ki,j,s, is defined as:
Amihudi,j,s =
1
Ni,j,s
∑
ki,j,s
|rki,j,s |
vki,j,s
. (11)
We use the average Amihud measure across the period from the default day to 30 days thereafter in
our analysis. This measure, based on Kyle (1985), and originally designed for limit order markets,
assesses the price impact of the traded volume, and hence the depth of the market. Intuitively, a
market is considered illiquid if a low transaction volume causes relatively large price changes.
Price dispersion measure
Similarly to Jankowitsch et al. (2011) and Friewald et al. (2012), we define the price dispersion,
di,j,s, of bond i of firm j on day s as:
di,j,s =
√√√√ 1∑
ki,j,s
vki,j,s
·
∑
ki,j,s
(
pki,j,s
mi,j,s
− 1
)2
· vki,j,s , (12)
where mi,j,s is the mean transaction price, representing the fair value of the bond, and pi,j,s are
the individual trade prices. The (volume-weighted) volatility of the individual trades around the
fair value permits a direct estimation of transaction costs based on transaction data. We use the
average price dispersion measure across the period from the default day to 30 days thereafter in
our analysis. The intuition behind this measure is motivated by market microstructure models: A
low dispersion of traded prices around its market-wide valuation indicates that the bond can be
bought or sold close to its fair value and, thus, at a lower transaction cost, indicative of a more
liquid instrument.
5.6. Pooled regression model
We rely on a pooled regression approach to analyze the determinants of recovery rates in the
US corporate bond market. Motivated by the discussion in the previous section, the recovery rate
pi of bond i issued by firm j, given default on day t, is assumed to be given by:
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pii,j,t = α+ β · (Bond characteristics)i,j + γ · (Firm fundamentals)j,t−1 (13)
+ φ · (Macroeconomic indicators)t + δ · (Liquidity)i,t
+ λ · (Default event type)i,j,t + µ · (Industry)j
+ ζ · (Seniority)i,j + i,j,t.
Thus, this specification combines the entire time-series and the cross-section of recovery rates. We
use ordinary least squares regressions, adjusting the standard errors for the existence of default
event clusters across firms, as described in Williams (2000) and Petersen (2009). This approach
addresses the issue that, in a particular default event, a firm may have several bonds outstanding,
and that all these defaulted bonds will show up as separate observations in our data.20 In addition,
all our regressions include the default event, industry, and seniority dummy variables.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive analysis
This section studies the underlying trading activity in defaulted bonds in the US corporate
bond market and presents descriptive statistics for the resulting recovery rates. We first explore
the traded prices and volumes on the default day, and in the 90-day windows before and after
default. Focusing on the recovery rate itself, we analyze its empirical distribution and quantify
the effects of the default event type, industry, and seniority on recovery rates. We also document
the variation in recovery rates over time. In addition, we provide summary statistics for the
explanatory variables that are used in the various regression specifications.
Trading microstructure of defaulted bonds
In this section, we examine the underlying trading activity in defaulted bonds. Fig. 1 provides
the evolution of the mean transaction prices per day as a percentage of face value, for a time
window starting 90 days before and ending 90 days after the default event day, across all default
event/bond combinations. In addition, the mean number of trades and trading volume in defaulted
bonds per day are presented. Investigating the transaction prices of all defaulted bonds, we find
that the lowest price is observed on the default day itself, and is around 35% of face value. The
price level 90 days before default is already low, and shows a declining trend from about 57% to
45%. However, the default event day witnesses a significant drop in price and is, thus, apparently
20As robustness checks, we repeated our analysis using only one (randomly selected) bond per event and using
only non-overlapping events (either employing only the first of overlapping events or the most severe event). We
basically obtained similar results (not presented in detail in the paper).
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not fully anticipated by the market. Interestingly, we find that the transaction price recovers
steadily to 42%, in the ensuing 30 days after default, whereas, after 30 days, the price shows a less
volatile evolution. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we find that the transaction prices within
the 90-day window before default are significantly different from those on the default day itself,
and in the subsequent 30 days, which are, in turn, significantly different from those in the time
frame from 31 to 90 days after default.21
The analysis of the mean number of trades and traded volume across all default event/bond
combinations exhibits interesting patterns. In particular, the average number of trades per bond
on the default day, of around 35, is significantly higher than on all other days. This number of
trades is also remarkably high compared to the market-wide average across the whole corporate
bond market of 3 to 4 trades per day per bond (see, e.g., Friewald et al., 2012). The number of
trades decreases rapidly in the 30 days after default, to around 8 to 10 trades per day per bond,
which is still higher than the market-wide average. The average daily traded volume per bond is
around $10 million on the default day, and decreases to the same extent as the number of trades,
to about $3 million. Again, the traded volume on the default day is higher than the market-wide
average of around $5 million (see, e.g., Friewald et al., 2012).22 As in the case of the transaction
prices, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals the statistical significance of the presented differences.
Overall, we document the lowest prices and highest levels of trading on the default day. The
price recovers steadily over the next 30 days, with a continuing active market for the bonds. Thus,
this finding provides strong evidence that the price evolution in this time window of zero to 30 days
is mainly driven by the reactions of market participants to the default event itself, as the trading
activity is significantly higher than in the pre-default and later post-default windows. Given the
low prices following default, at least for some bonds, the increased trading activity is not a sign
of increased liquidity per se, but rather evidence of sell-side pressure.23 The following rationale
might explain this pattern: On the one hand, this effect might be driven by some investors having
particular needs to trade at these default prices, e.g., because they immediately have to liquidate
their positions due to mandate restrictions or binding risk limits. Furthermore, the evolution of
the trading volume suggests that it is necessary to split up and sell larger positions in defaulted
bonds over time.24 On the other hand, trading activity in this window might be stimulated by
21Note that this result is not triggered by different sets of bonds that are traded before and after default, as we
define a minimum level of trading activity in both time windows, as described in Section 3.
22We also quantified the average trading activity in the defaulted bonds between issuance and the start of our
time windows, based on TRACE data, and found that the number of trades and traded volume were in line with
the market-wide averages for these periods.
23Note that we observe this pattern in roughly 70% of all default event/bond combinations and, thus, it is
not driven by a few events with strong price movements. Therefore, postponing the selling activities might be
worthwhile for investors trading marginal volumes (see Section 6.4 for a discussion).
24Indeed, practitioners we spoke to confirmed that trading a large volume in a defaulted bond often makes it
necessary to be active in the market for several days due to the price impact of individual trades.
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investors’ heterogeneous beliefs concerning the implications of the default event for the value of
the firm’s assets. Based on these findings, we define the recovery rate in our analysis as the mean
transaction price in the window between the default date and 30 days after default. Thus, this
specification can be interpreted as the price, on average and hence in expectation, resulting from
trading in this time window. We consider this definition of a market-based recovery rate more
reliable and relevant for investors than quotations or last-trade information drawn from the default
date alone, which have been used by many prior studies due to data limitations that existed before
the detailed TRACE data became available. This significant methodological distinction makes our
subsequent analysis all the more robust.
Fig. 1 further investigates the trading activity among four important subgroups: for nonfi-
nancial versus financial bonds, and investment- versus speculative-grade bonds, we again analyze
the mean transaction prices, the number of trades, and traded volumes in the 90 days before and
90 days after the default event. The general patterns observed in the previous analysis of the
full sample are confirmed in each subgroup: First, the lowest transaction price is reported on the
default day itself. Second, trading activity is especially high on the default day and gradually
declines after that. When comparing nonfinancial and financial firms, we find that, for nonfinan-
cial firms, the price decline leading towards the default day is smoother, and the price drop on
the default day itself is less severe (from 43% to 35%, compared to 47% to 33% for financials),
indicating that the actual default is more of a surprise to the market in the case of financial
firms. For both groups, the number of trades and the traded volume are especially high on the
default day. In addition, the general level of trading activity around the default date seems to
be higher for financial firms than for nonfinancial firms, possibly on account of the surprise. For
example, the mean number of trades is around 22 for nonfinancial firms, compared to around 70
for financial firms, on the default day. The comparison of investment- versus speculative-grade
bonds also yields interesting insights. While the mean transaction prices for speculative-grade
bonds decline gradually as default approaches, prices drop rather steeply on the default day in
the case of investment-grade bonds (from 42% to 35% for the former, compared to 47% to 27%
for the latter). This may, again, indicate a greater surprise element in the case of default for the
more creditworthy investment-grade bonds. The number of trades and traded volumes are higher
for investment-grade bonds, as expected.
Fig. 2 presents mean transaction prices from 90 days before to 90 days after default for the
different default event types.25 Transaction prices for Chapter 11 liquidation and restructuring
filings exhibit very similar patterns. In both cases, the default event induces a relatively sharp
25The analyses of the traded volumes and number of trades for different default event types yield very similar
results to the previous analyses and are, therefore, not presented, in the interests of conserving space.
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decline in prices on that date itself, from about 50% to 25%. Within the first 30 days after default,
prices recover to around 40%. Especially interesting is the analysis of mean transaction prices in
the case of distressed exchanges. The pattern reveals that these cases are the only default events
for which transaction prices before default are lower than after default, indicating that the default
itself is seen as a sign of relief by the market, after an uncertain negotiation process. In particular,
distressed exchanges exhibit the highest transaction prices in the post-event phase. For rating-
based default events, we find that unlikely-to-pay announcement events by all rating agencies lead
to a sharp drop in prices, indicating an element of surprise, whereas the event of downgrading to
an actual default rating class seems to be generally anticipated by the market.
Recovery rates and effects of event type, industry, and seniority
Analyzing the resulting recovery rates, i.e., the mean transaction prices across the period from
the default day to 30 days after default, we first present the empirical distribution of the recovery
rates of defaulted US corporate bonds between 2002 and 2010, in Fig. 3. The mean recovery rate
is equal to 38.6% with a standard deviation of 27.4%. While the mean recovery rate is close to
the 40% estimate provided by Altman and Kishore (1996), which is widely used in academia and
industry, the standard deviation around this number suggests substantial variation in recovery
rates across different dimensions; therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the driving factors is
important. Specifically, three peaks can be identified in the empirical distribution: one up to 20%,
one between 40% and 50%, and one between 60% and 70%. The lowest peak is mainly driven by
the recovery rates of bonds issued by Lehman Brothers, which traded at about 15% after it filed
for protection under Chapter 11 on September 15, 2008. The defaulted bonds of CIT Group and
Washington Mutual contribute to the other two peaks. Overall, the distribution documents the
stochastic nature of the recovery rate.
Fig. 4 displays the time-series of mean recovery rates in the US corporate bond market as a
quarterly moving average. We find that recovery rates are highly volatile over time: around 60%
in 2007, compared to 20% at the end of 2008. Not surprisingly, the lowest mean recovery rates
can be found during the financial crisis. Thus, cross-sectional average recovery rates are clearly
not constant over time.
We present summary statistics in Table 2, displaying the recovery rates across different default
event types, industries, and seniority levels in order to analyze the important determinants of
recovery rates. In total, we report 2, 235 default event/bond combinations for which transaction
data are available. Panel A displays the statistics for the overall sample and confirms the results
discussed when presenting the empirical distribution. Panel B displays recovery rates across
different default event types. Chapter 11 restructuring filings form the largest group, consisting
of 492 observations, whereas we observe only 13 Chapter 11 liquidations. Interestingly, we find
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only an insignificant difference between the mean recovery rates of Chapter 11 restructuring and
liquidation filings (i.e., 37.1% vs. 40.7%). Distressed exchanges exhibit, on average, the highest
recovery rate of 51.3%, confirming that default events not relying on formal bankruptcy procedures
have significantly higher recovery rates, potentially as a result of preserving more of the “going
concern” value for bondholders. Furthermore, we find significant differences in recovery rates
when analyzing the default grades of the rating agencies. We find, within the Fitch and Moody’s
credit classifications, that the actual default grade has a significantly lower recovery rate than the
unlikely-to-pay grade (Fitch: 31.4% vs. 41.3%; Moody’s: 16.0% vs. 44.9%). This difference is
pronounced, especially in the case of Moody’s, indicating that its rating framework is indeed more
sensitive to the expected loss. For Standard and Poor’s, such a difference is not observable, which
could indicate that Standard and Poor’s does not incorporate recovery aspects, as suggested by
its rating framework.26
Panel C displays recovery rates across nonfinancial industries, while Panel D reports recovery
rates for financial firms. One should note that our sample is fairly balanced between nonfinan-
cial and financial firms (1, 090 observations belong to nonfinancial firms, while 1, 145 belong to
financial firms). We find that, among nonfinancial industries, utility and energy firms recover,
on average, the most (e.g., electricity 48% and oil & gas 44.4%), while retail firms recover the
least at 33.4%. Among financial industries, we find that the overall highest recovery rate of 56.6%
is reported for the credit & financing industry, while the financial services industry exhibits the
lowest recovery rates; this result is mainly driven by the low recoveries of Lehman Brothers debt.
The averages across financial firms (38.8%) and nonfinancial firms (38.5%) are almost identical,
while the standard deviations are high in every industry group.
Panel E displays the average recovery rates across seniority levels. As expected, secured bonds
recover, on average, the most (around 49.3%), while bonds that are subordinated recover, on av-
erage, the least (around 15.1%). Interestingly, we find only a small difference in recovery rates
between guaranteed (40.3%) and unsecured bonds (39.1%). This could be the result of guaran-
tees being provided to the bonds of subsidiaries by the holding company, making the guarantees
worthless in the case of the default of the holding company.
Summary statistics of the explanatory variables
The previous analysis shows a pattern of significant cross-sectional and time-series variation in
recovery rates, which we may be able to explain using a more detailed analysis of a comprehensive
set of explanatory variables. Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the main explanatory
variables in our empirical analysis for the full sample and separately for nonfinancial firms and
26Moody’s Investors Service (2002), Standard & Poor’s (2011), and FitchRatings (2013) provide the relevant
information concerning the three rating frameworks.
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financial firms, covering bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, and liquidity proxies. We first
discuss the results for the full sample, and then highlight the differences between nonfinancial and
financial firms.
Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the results for the bond characteristics: The average issue
size of defaulted bonds is $400 million. The average maturity and coupon rate are 6.82 years
and 7.48%, respectively. The average bond rating one year before default is BB, i.e., most of the
defaulting bonds are from the speculative grades. All these variables show considerable variation.
For example, the standard deviation of the credit rating is five notches. More than 80% of the
bonds are deliverable into a CDS contract. Analyzing the four covenant categories, we find that
approximately half of the bonds are encumbered by an investment, financing, and event covenant,
while one-third of the bonds carry a dividend covenant. Interestingly, Table 3 shows that, for
financial firms, the average bond rating is A− (investment grade), while for nonfinancial firms,
the average bond rating is B− (speculative grade), indicating that the default of a financial firm
is often not considered very likely by rating agencies one year before the actual event, whereas,
for nonfinancial firms, the economic situation of the company is already perceived as weak one
year prior to default. A similar difference, with parallel reasoning, can be found for the coupon
rate (financial firms: 5.8% vs. nonfinancial firms: 8.6%). Furthermore, defaulted financial bonds
have, on average, a longer maturity by about 2.5 years. In line with previous literature (see, e.g.,
Chava et al., 2010), covenants are more common among nonfinancial than financial firms.
Panel B in Table 3 presents the statistics for firm fundamentals. On average, firms have an
equity ratio of 6.6% of total assets. The average default barrier equals 47.8% of total assets.
Comparing financial and nonfinancial firms, we find that there is only a small difference between
the equity ratios of these two groups. Interestingly, the default barrier is higher for financial
firms (around 53%) than for nonfinancial firms (around 23%), indicating that the former use more
short-term financing. On average, receivables are 50% of total assets for financial firms, but only
10% for nonfinancial firms. There is also a huge gap between the two groups of firms in terms
of the intangibility of assets: For nonfinancial firms, intangibility is ten times as high as it is for
financial firms. Analyzing the size proxies, in the whole sample, the average firm size (in terms
of total assets) is equal to $139 billion, with 2, 970 employees.27 While the average firm size of
defaulted financial firms is ten times that of nonfinancial firms, the latter have 2.2 times as many
employees as the former.
Panel C summarizes the trading activity variables and liquidity measures. The trading activity
variables confirm that the number of trades and trading volume are above the market-wide average.
Interestingly, bonds of financial firms have, on average, five trades more per day than nonfinancial
27The average firm size is skewed by a few large financial firms.
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firms. However, the volume per trade is much lower (around $260, 000 vs. $470, 000). Analyzing
the liquidity measures, we find that trading in defaulted bonds generates relatively high transaction
costs. Thus, defaulted bonds are extremely illiquid in this sense. The average price impact given
by the Amihud measure of a $1 million transaction is 1.49%, while the market-wide average is at
0.36%; similarly, the average transaction cost, estimated by the price dispersion measure, amounts
to 2.80%, which is six times as high as the overall market average of 0.43% (for comparison, see
Friewald et al., 2012).
Fig. 5 provides time-series evidence regarding the key macroeconomic variables, i.e., the
market-wide default rate, the Federal Funds rate and the 10-year Treasury rate (used in the
slope variable). Studying the market-wide default rate, three regimes can be identified: the “dot-
com” bubble in 2002 and 2003, the Ford and General Motors crisis in 2005, and the financial
crisis in 2008 and 2009.28 The period during the financial crisis saw the highest market-wide
quarterly default rate, of around 3.6%. We find a significant variation in default rates during our
observation period, allowing us to analyze the relation between recovery and default rates.29 The
Federal Funds rate shows similar patterns, but in the opposite direction, i.e., low rates in the crisis
periods, and high rates in the boom phases. The difference between the 10-year Treasury rate and
the Federal Funds rate, is large at the end of a crisis, and low or negative at the beginning of a
crisis period, whereas the 10-year rate itself is rather stable over time, albeit with a decrease since
the financial crisis, due to central bank intervention in the form of quantitative easing.
6.2. Regression models explaining recovery rates
In this section, we present the results of the various regression models explaining the variation
in the recovery rates of corporate bonds. The recovery rates are explained by bond characteristics,
firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables, and liquidity proxies, as well as dummy variables
for the default event types, industries, and seniority classes.30 Table 4 presents six different
regression specifications.31 Model 1 represents a regression including only the dummy variables
for the default event types, industries, and seniority levels. This specification can be used as a
benchmark against which we explore the increases in explanatory power of the other specifications.
28See Friewald et al. (2012) for a related analysis on the different regimes in the US corporate bond market.
29Note that we do not present individual time-series for the industry-specific default rates, in the interest of
conserving space. However, most industries have high default rates during the financial crisis, whereas between
2002 and 2007, there are more pronounced differences in the default rates across industries.
30In addition, we performed a factor analysis and identified five factors representing a balance sheet factor, a
size factor, a macroeconomic factor, a trading activity factor, and a transaction costs factor, and then ran the
regressions afresh based on these factors to avoid potential multicollinearity. The results based on these factors
confirm the overall findings (sign and significance) and are, thus, not presented in detail.
31Note that we additionally employed treatment-effects and Heckman (1979) procedures, respectively, in order
to address potential self-selection of firms into either formal bankruptcy procedures or out-of-court default events,
as applied in Bris et al. (2006) and Davydenko and Franks (2008) in the context of recovery rates. We find in all
our specifications insignificant Inverse-Mills ratios and, moreover, the results remain unchanged when we employ
the self-selection procedures (similar findings are reported in the related literature). Therefore, we do not report
the results in detail.
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We find an adjusted R2 of 37% for Model 1. This shows reasonable explanatory power even
for this specification. Thus, important dimensions are already included and the results of the
descriptive analysis are confirmed. The next four specifications, Models 2 to 5, control for each of
the four defined groups of variables, i.e., bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic
variables, and liquidity proxies, respectively. We find that all four groups add to the explanation of
recovery rates. Bond characteristics (Model 2) increase the adjusted R2 by six percentage points
to 43%. However, these characteristics are not as important as those in the other groups. Firm
fundamentals (Model 3) and macroeconomic variables (Model 4) seem to be of similar importance,
exhibiting adjusted R2 values of 47% and 48%, respectively. We obtain the highest adjusted R2
of 53% by including liquidity measures (Model 5). Thus, the trading activity and transaction cost
measures are important additional variables, necessary in explaining recovery rates.
Model 6 in Table 4 includes all four sets of variables. We focus on this complete model to
discuss the effects of the individual variables. We find that this model is able to capture 66%
of the variation in recovery rates. Among the bond characteristics, six variables turn out to be
significant. We find that bonds with a longer maturity exhibit lower recoveries, i.e., an increase
in the time to maturity by one year decreases the recovery rate by around 0.6% of face value.
This effect might be caused by sell-side pressure imposed by large institutional investors such as
insurance companies, which typically hold bonds with a longer time to maturity but may be forced
to sell following default due to mandate restrictions. Furthermore, we find a small positive effect
for the coupon rate, potentially indicating that bonds with a higher coupon are of higher value
under certain outcomes of the default event. This effect indicates a (small) positive likelihood that
the contractual cash flows of the bond (including the higher coupon) may actually still be paid
even after the default event. The rating variable is significant; i.e., the rating one year before the
default event conveys information concerning the recovery rate. A one-rating-notch difference is
associated with a 1.1% difference in the recovery rate. An interesting result is provided by the
CDS dummy that indicates whether a bond can be delivered into a CDS contract. In particular,
we find that bonds that are deliverable into a CDS contract exhibit around 6.2% higher recovery
rates of face value than bonds that are non-deliverable. This effect is quite significant in economic
terms, and may arise due to a possible increase in demand from protection buyers, who are obliged
to deliver certain bonds to protection sellers in the case of default. Regarding the four different
covenant groups, the results reveal that, first, bonds that carry investment covenants exhibit higher
recoveries (around 4.4% of face value), and second, bonds that exhibit financing covenants recover
up to 9.7% more of their face value, which is a strong economic effect. Thus, restrictions on the
investment and financing policy are an effective tool by which creditors can increase their recovery
rates.
Among the firm characteristics, we find significant effects for the ratios motivated by structural
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credit risk models, i.e., the higher is the equity value and the lower is the default barrier, the
higher is the recovery rate. In particular, the partial net effects of these two ratios are roughly
similar, while the economic impacts differ. That is, an increase in the equity ratio and a decrease
in the default barrier by ten percentage points increase the recovery rate by around 1.3% and
2.2%, respectively. In addition, we find marginally significant effects for receivables and firm
size. The other firm characteristics employed (long-term debt issuance, intangibility, receivables,
profitability, and employees) are statistically insignificant in the joint model. Thus, the information
from these characteristics may already be contained in the industry dummies.
The third group of explanatory variables are macroeconomic characteristics, of which the
two most important variables are the market-wide and industry-specific default rates. Several
studies (see, e.g., Altman et al., 2002) conclude that aggregate default rates and aggregate recovery
rates are negatively associated. Moreover, Acharya et al. (2007) find that industries in distress
experience lower recovery rates. As already mentioned in Section 5, we employ more precise
estimates of the default rates; based on the default event date, we derive, for each recovery rate,
a market-wide as well as an industry-specific default rate in a trailing 90-day window, so as to
measure the contemporaneous interaction effect between default rates and recovery rates. In
addition, we consider the Federal Funds rate on the default event date as the relevant short-term
rate and we explore the slope between the 10-year Treasury rate and this short-term interest rate.
All four variables are highly statistically significant. In particular, we find that high default rates
(market-wide as well as industry-specific) and low short-term interest rates imply lower recoveries.
For example, an increase in the market-wide and industry-specific default rate by one percentage
point lead to a decrease in recoveries by around 3.3% and 0.7%, respectively. In addition, we find a
positive effect of the slope factor; i.e., in regimes that could be associated with higher optimism, we
observe higher recoveries. Overall, as expected, poor economic conditions result in lower recovery
rates as systematic risk factors influence the level of recoveries.
The fourth group of explanatory variables consists of the liquidity measures (volume, number
of trades, Amihud measure, and price dispersion measure). We find that liquidity effects are of
particular importance in explaining the variation in recovery rates across different bonds in default.
In particular, the price dispersion measure is highly significant and exhibits a negative coefficient,
indicating that illiquid bonds suffer more of a decline in the event of default than liquid bonds. In
particular, we find that an increase in the price dispersion measure by 100 basis points leads to a
decrease in recovery rates by around 5.0%.32 The volume and number of trades variables turn out
32Note that our result concerning the impact of liquidity on the recovery rate does not depend on the use of the
price dispersion measure. We tested other measures, e.g., the Roll measure, and found similar effects. However,
the price dispersion measure appears to be more suitable in the case of defaulted bonds, for which we observe a
large number of small trades. Whereas the price dispersion measure uses a low weight for these observations, some
of the other measures give a particularly high weight to low-volume transactions, thus exaggerating their relative
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to be insignificant, indicating that higher trading activity after default is more a sign of sell-side
pressure, at least for some bonds, than of increased liquidity.
Overall, we find important factors to be driving the recovery rates of corporate bonds following
default. As expected, bond characteristics have the lowest explanatory power. However, we
document the strong economic effect of deliverability into CDS contracts and bond covenants
on the recovery rate. On the other hand, firm characteristics motivated by structural credit
risk models, and macroeconomic variables, are clearly linked to recovery rates. Interestingly,
liquidity variables, especially those proxies that measure transaction costs, are significant factors
in explaining recovery rates.33
6.3. Subsample analysis for nonfinancial and speculative-grade bonds
In this section, we present the results for two important subsamples of our data set, i.e.,
nonfinancial and speculative-grade bonds. This analysis allows us to validate the results of the
previous section, and to analyze whether certain results could be driven by financial firms (es-
pecially Lehman Brothers) or by large investment-grade firms. Table 5 provides the results for
nonfinancial (Model 1) and speculative-grade bonds (Model 2). We find an adjusted R2 of 55%
for both subsamples. Analyzing the effects of the individual variables, we find similar results to
those for the overall sample; all groups of characteristics add to the explanatory power, with most
variables that are significant in the overall model being so again for the subsamples. Thus, the
main results stay much the same for these two subsamples.
However, some interesting differences can be highlighted, in particular, among the bond char-
acteristics for the CDS delivery and bond covenant variables. The option to deliver the bond
into a CDS contract reveals the following insights in the two subsamples: While, for nonfinancial
bonds, the possibility of delivering the bond into a CDS contract produces a similar effect to
that observed in the overall sample, we find a weaker effect for speculative-grade bonds, perhaps
indicating that many CDS positions in these bonds are closed before an expected default event.
Concerning the bond covenants, we find that financing restrictions are important determinants of
recovery rates for both subsamples, while the other covenants are of minor importance, indicating
that protection against changes in the debt structure and minimum standards for the repayment
capacity provide higher recovery rates.
As for firm characteristics, we find similar results in the subsample regressions as in the overall
sample. Interestingly, the partial effects of equity and the default barrier become stronger for
both of these groups, compared to the full sample. In addition, receivables and the number of
importance.
33This implication of low liquidity of defaulted bonds has been recently discussed theoretically by He and
Milbradt (2013), who incorporate liquidity effects immediately after default in their credit risk model.
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employees seem to matter for nonfinancial and speculative-grade bonds; e.g., an increase in the
number of employees by 1, 000 leads to an increase in recoveries by around 0.5% of face value for
these two groups.
The significance and directional effects of the macroeconomic variables remain basically un-
changed in the subsamples compared to the full sample. However, further interesting insights can
be obtained from the liquidity measures. For the transaction cost measures (both Amihud and
price dispersion metrics), we find results similar to those for the full sample. However, the effect of
the price dispersion measure is more pronounced in these two subsets. An increase in transaction
costs by 100 basis points is associated with a decrease in recoveries by 7.5% to 8.8%, indicating
that illiquidity effects are of particular importance for nonfinancial and speculative-grade bonds
in explaining the variation in bond recoveries.
6.4. Analysis of price changes following the recovery rate window
In this section, we compare the presented recovery rates covering the traded prices on the
default day and the following 30 days (i.e., the recovery rate window), to the traded prices in a
later post-default period represented by the time window from 31 to 90 days following default.
Thus, we explore the potential effect on our results of the temporary price pressure observed
directly after default. In particular, this comparison allows us to address the question of whether
the cross-sectional determinants of post-default traded prices are influenced by the specific time
window chosen. In addition, we study to what extent observed price changes between the two
time windows can be explained by changes in the underlying liquidity.
For this comparison, we quantify the average traded price for each bond/event combination in
the time window from 31 to 90 days after default. As already indicated by Fig. 1 and discussed
in Section 6.1, the average traded price in this time window (41.6%) is significantly higher than
in the time window from zero to 30 days after default (38.6%), as temporary sell-side pressure,
at least for some bonds, arises directly after default. Thus, investors selling average quantities
can expect a 3% higher recovery rate with respect to the face value of the bond. As indicated
by Fig. 2, this increase is mainly observed for distressed exchanges and unlikely-to-pay events,
whereas there are no significant changes for formal bankruptcy procedures. Examining the price
movements of different industries, this increase can be found for most industries, with oil & gas
and electricity exhibiting a particularly strong increase of around 5% of face value. Concerning
the bond seniorities, for unsecured, guaranteed, and secured bonds we find the indicated average
price increase, whereas the prices of subordinated bonds stay at much the same level throughout
the 90 days following default.34
34Note that, to conserve space, the results concerning prices in the time window from 31 to 90 days following
default with respect to industries and seniorities are not presented in detail.
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Given the observed differences between these two time windows in terms of average traded
prices, it is important to explore whether these changes only affect the general level of prices or
significantly influence the previously presented effects of the cross-sectional determinants too. To
address this question, we repeat the regression analysis, using the average traded prices in the time
window from 31 to 90 days after default as the dependent variable. We also adjust the liquidity
measures accordingly. The results are given in Table 5, Model 3. We find an adjusted R2 of 66%,
meaning that the explanatory power of the determinants is basically identical to when we use the
time window from zero to 30 days after default. In addition, the signs and significance levels of the
individual variables correspond well to the original specification. The only relevant exception, and
the most interesting difference between the specifications, is that trading activity variables (volume
and number of trades) are additional significant variables explaining prices in the time window from
31 to 90 days after default. Both variables enter with a positive sign; i.e., higher trading activity
corresponds to higher levels of liquidity and, thus, higher price levels. Analyzing the economic
significance, a one standard deviation change in trading volume is related to a price differential
of 2.3% of face value; correspondingly, for the number of trades, a one standard deviation change
relates to a price differential of 2.1%. Thus, we find that, in later post-default periods, the trading
activity variables explain cross-sectional price differences. Such a relation cannot be found directly
after default since, for at least some bonds, an increase in trading activity is not a sign of increased
liquidity, but rather of severe sell-side pressure. Examining the transaction cost variables, we find
that the Amihud measure is significant in this specification as well; a one standard deviation
change corresponds to a 2.7% change in price levels.
The coefficients of the liquidity variables provide interesting implications in general: Note that,
as already discussed, we observe significantly higher trading activity in the time period from zero
to 30 days following default, combined with lower prices. However, if we were to assume, for a
specific bond, a similar level of trading activity as is observed directly after default occurring in
the time window from 31 to 90 days following default, then the presented results suggest that a
significant price impact would emerge. This impact would presumably decrease the price level
to the range observed in the recovery rate window. Thus, the investors cannot simply shift their
trading activity from directly after default to the later period as similar price pressure effects
would occur, as the depth of the market is still thin in the period 31 to 90 days following default.
Thus, overall, the presented variables consistently explain prices within the first 90 days after
default, with the individual effects remaining roughly at the same level between the recovery rate
window and the period from 31 to 90 days after default. The only important difference between
the two time windows is that liquidity measures based on trading activity provide cross-sectional
explanatory power after effects induced by temporary sell-side pressure cease, and higher trading
activity indeed signals higher liquidity for a given bond.
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Therefore, in order to further elaborate on the importance of liquidity at different stages
following default, we study the relation between changes in the liquidity measures and the traded
prices. As a first step, we compare the liquidity measures observed in the two different time
windows (see Table 6 Panel A). The number of trades is on average 10.7 in the recovery rate window
compared to 5.7 in the later period with the mean volume per trade being $360, 000 compared to
$345, 000. Addressing the transaction cost metrics, the price impact of trading $1 million amounts
to 1.5%, as given by the Amihud measure compared to 0.9% in the later period, while the mean
price dispersion measure is 2.8% compared to 2.4%. Thus, we observe considerable differences in
the liquidity measures; however, we find that trading in defaulted bonds in the window from 31
to 90 days after default still results in relatively high transaction costs.
Given the observed differences, we explore how the evolution in the underlying liquidity is
related to the price changes, employing an additional regression analysis. Table 6 Panel B displays
five different models, with the dependent variable given by the change in the average traded price
between the recovery rate window and the time window of 31 to 90 days after default, and the
explanatory variables represented by the changes in the liquidity measures between these two
windows (additionally, the models contain dummies for the default event type, industry, and
seniority). Models 1 to 4 control for each of the liquidity measures, in turn, while Model 5
contains the full model. Overall, we find that all liquidity variables turn out to be significant with
the expected sign when included individually (see Models 1 to 4). Focusing on the full model
(Model 5), we find an adjusted R2 of 23%. Three liquidity measures are significant − the two
trading activity variables (volume and number of trades) and the price dispersion measure. Volume
and trades enter with a positive sign, indicating that bonds for which trading activity remains
high after the recovery rate window experience a stronger price increase compared to bonds for
which trading activity returns to lower levels. In particular, for a one standard deviation change
in volume (number of trades), prices increase by as much as 0.4% (0.7%) of face value. Bonds for
which transaction costs decrease by more, after the recovery rate window has ended, experience
significantly higher price increases. Thus, a one standard deviation decrease in the price dispersion
measure increases prices by 1.5% of face value. Overall, the presented results reveal that liquidity
effects account for an economically significant portion of the price formation in default, when
compared to the average price increase of 3% of face value between these two windows.
7. Conclusion
The recovery rate in the event of default is an important risk factor in pricing financial contracts
exposed to credit risk. Many defaults in the recent past have highlighted the stochastic nature
of recovery rates for corporate bonds. Therefore, it is important to understand the determinants
of this risk factor in greater detail. In this paper, we examine the recovery rates of defaulted US
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corporate bonds, based on a complete set of transaction data over the time period from 2002 to
2010. In particular, we investigate the underlying microstructure of trading activity for a broad
set of default event types covering formal bankruptcy procedures, out-of-court restructurings, and
downgrades to default status by rating agencies representing payment defaults and unlikely-to-
pay events. This analysis allows us to provide reliable market-based estimates of the recovery
rates, quantify liquidity effects and, hence, study price formation for individual defaulted bonds,
an innovation relative to the prior literature. Our research focus is on the relation between these
recovery rates and a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic
variables, and liquidity measures.
Studying the microstructure of the trading activity reveals that the lowest bond prices indeed
occur on the default event day itself (around 35% of face value, on average). Interestingly, trading
activity on this day, measured by volume and number of trades, is quite high in comparison with
non-defaulted bonds. The prices recover to around 42% in the following 30 days after default, with
the trading activity still remaining high, indicating temporary price pressure following a default
event. Thereafter, trading activity dies down to pre-default levels. Based on these findings, we
define the market-based recovery rate of a defaulted bond as the average traded price over the
default day and the following 30 days.
The subsequent regression analysis explains 66% of the total variation in recovery rates, em-
ploying bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables, and liquidity measures
as explanatory variables. We find that transaction cost metrics measuring liquidity are partic-
ularly important variables. Considering the other characteristics, we show that bond covenants
restricting firms’ investment (respectively, financing) policies, balance sheet ratios motivated by
structural credit risk models, and macroeconomic conditions are significant factors. As expected,
we confirm that the type of default event, the industry in which the firm operates, and the senior-
ity of the bond, are of importance. Additional evidence for the importance of liquidity effects is
provided by exploring price changes observed at different stages following default.
In summary, we provide a comprehensive analysis offering detailed insights into the trading
microstructure of defaulted bonds as well as into the stochastic nature of recovery rates, and
quantify the effects of various endogenous and exogenous factors on these recovery rates. Our
results will be of interest to both academics and practitioners in relation to pricing corporate bonds,
managing bond portfolio risk, and setting capital adequacy standards for financial institutions.
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Fig. 1. This figure shows mean transaction prices and volumes, as well as the average number of trades per
bond, on the default day and in the time window from 90 days before to 90 days after default, for the sample of
all bonds, for nonfinancial and financial bonds, as well as for investment- and speculative-grade bonds. The left
side of the figure displays transaction prices, while the right side of the figure displays trading activity. The data
set consists of transaction data reported by TRACE for the period from July 2002 to October 2010 and amounts
to approximately 1, 734, 000 trades with an aggregate volume of $500 billion covering 2, 235 default event/bond
combinations. The default events were obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database and the NYU
Salomon Center Master Default Database and cover bankruptcy filings, out-of-court restructurings, and downgrades
to default status by rating agencies representing payment defaults and unlikely-to-pay events.
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Fig. 3. This figure shows the empirical distribution of recovery rates of defaulted US corporate bonds. Recov-
ery rates are defined as the average traded price per bond over the default day and the following 30 days after
default. The data set consists of transaction data reported by TRACE for the period from July 2002 to October
2010 and amounts to approximately 1, 734, 000 trades with an aggregate volume of $500 billion covering 2, 235 de-
fault event/bond combinations. The default events data were obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database and cover bankruptcy filings, out-of-court re-
structurings, and downgrades to default status by rating agencies representing payment defaults and unlikely-to-pay
events.
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Fig. 4. This figure shows the time-series of mean recovery rates (quarterly moving average) in the US corporate
bond market. Recovery rates are defined as the average traded price per bond over the default day and the following
30 days after default. The data set consists of transaction data reported by TRACE for the period from July 2002
to October 2010 and amounts to approximately 1, 734, 000 trades with an aggregate volume of $500 billion covering
2, 235 default event/bond combinations. The default events data were obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income
Securities Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database and cover bankruptcy filings, out-
of-court restructurings, and downgrades to default status by rating agencies representing payment defaults and
unlikely-to-pay events.
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Fig. 5. This figure shows the time-series of the market-wide default rate in a 90-day trailing window, which
is defined as the corresponding fraction of defaulted bonds and outstanding bonds in the whole US corporate
bond market, the Federal Funds rate, and the ten-year US Treasury yield for the time period from July 2002 to
October 2010. The data set consists of transaction data reported by TRACE for the period from July 2002 to
October 2010 and amounts to approximately 1, 734, 000 trades with an aggregate volume of $500 billion covering
2, 235 default event/bond combinations. The default events data were obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income
Securities Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database and cover bankruptcy filings, out-
of-court restructurings, and downgrades to default status by rating agencies representing payment defaults and
unlikely-to-pay events. The Federal Funds rate and the Treasury yield were retrieved from Bloomberg.
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Table 4
This table reports the results of the various regression specifications. The dependent variable is the recovery
rate of the default event/bond combinations. The explanatory variables are given by bond characteristics (amount
issued, maturity, coupon, rating, and dummies for CDS availability as well as investment, dividend, financing, and
event covenant), firm characteristics (equity, default barrier, LTD issuance, intangibility, receivables, profitability,
total assets, and employees), macroeconomic variables (market-wide default rate, industry-specific default rate,
Federal Funds rate and slope of the interest rate curve), liquidity proxies (volume, number of trades, Amihud
measure, and price dispersion measure), and dummy variables representing default event types, industries, and
seniority levels. Model 1 represents a regression including only these dummy variables. Model 2 additionally
controls for the bond characteristics. Model 3 controls for the firm characteristics. Model 4 controls for the
macroeconomic indicators and Model 5 controls for the liquidity proxies. Model 6 represents the complete model
containing all variables. The data set consists of transaction data reported by TRACE for the period from July
2002 to October 2010 and amounts to approximately 1, 734, 000 trades with an aggregate volume of $500 billion
covering 2, 235 default event/bond combinations. The default events data were obtained from the Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database and cover bankruptcy filings,
out-of-court restructurings, and downgrades to default status by rating agencies representing payment defaults
and unlikely-to-pay events. Bond characteristics and macroconomic data were retrieved from Bloomberg and the
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, the firm fundamentals from Compustat. Clustered standard errors at
the default-event/firm level (see, e.g., Petersen, 2009) are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** <
0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 36.5099∗∗∗ 57.9068∗∗∗ 32.3022∗∗∗ 30.6604∗∗∗ 50.5939∗∗∗ 13.1919
(1.7535) (5.8240) (4.9439) (5.3943) (2.0104) (11.4184)
Amount issued −0.2760 0.6603
(0.1895) (0.8613)
Maturity −0.6359∗∗∗ −0.6164∗∗∗
(0.0641) (0.0631)
Coupon 0.5176∗ 0.7089∗∗
(0.2803) (0.3139)
Rating −1.5283∗∗∗ −1.0579∗∗∗
(0.3275) (0.3836)
CDS availability 0.8345 6.1844∗∗∗
(1.8968) (2.0805)
Investment covenant 4.8720∗∗ 4.4075∗∗
(2.0599) (1.9355)
Dividend covenant 8.0674∗∗∗ −1.7356
(1.9915) (2.1808)
Financing covenant 7.8911∗∗∗ 9.7090∗∗∗
(2.1692) (2.0492)
Event covenant −1.7631 −2.5204
(2.0517) (1.8549)
Equity 0.1603∗∗∗ 0.1279∗∗∗
(0.0573) (0.0526)
Default barrier −0.2523∗∗∗ −0.2175∗∗∗
(0.0758) (0.0649)
LTD issuance −0.1124∗∗∗ −0.0029
(0.0269) (0.0285)
Intangibility −0.2401∗∗∗ −0.0587
(0.0571) (0.0467)
Receivables 0.2465∗∗∗ 0.1638∗
(0.0824) (0.0865)
Profitability 0.0044 −0.0642
(0.0627) (0.0546)
Total assets 1.5252 2.1414∗
(1.1822) (1.1302)
Employees −0.5454∗∗∗ 0.0839
(0.1829) (0.1742)
Market default rate −4.1092∗∗∗ −3.3428∗∗∗
(1.0208) (1.1457)
Industry default rate −0.8631∗∗∗ −0.6561∗∗∗
(0.1186) (0.1068)
Federal Funds rate 12.1875∗∗∗ 7.0241∗∗∗
(1.2165) (1.4479)
Slope 13.3993∗∗∗ 7.4729∗∗∗
(1.4790) (1.6254)
Volume 0.0955 0.0785
(0.1814) (0.2183)
Trades 0.1299∗∗∗ 0.0140
(0.0263) (0.0212)
Amihud −0.0790 0.0797
(0.2730) (0.3125)
Price dispersion −5.6500∗∗∗ −4.9700∗∗∗
(0.2900) (0.3300)
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.66
Observations 2, 235 2, 235 1, 972 2, 235 2, 024 1, 809
Event dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seniority dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5
This table reports the results for three additional regression analyses. The explanatory variables are given
by bond characteristics (amount issued, maturity, coupon, rating, and dummies for CDS availability as well as
investment, dividend, financing, and event covenant), firm characteristics (equity, default barrier, LTD issuance,
intangibility, receivables, profitability, total assets, and employees), macroeconomic variables (market-wide default
rate, industry-specific default rate, Federal Funds rate, and slope of the interest rate curve), liquidity proxies
(volume, number of trades, Amihud measure, and price dispersion measure), and dummy variables representing
default event types, industries, and seniority levels. In Model 1 (nonfinancial firms) and Model 2 (speculative-
grade firms), the dependent variable is the recovery rate of the default event/bond combinations. Model 3 contains
results for an alternative period, where the dependent variable is represented by the average traded price per default
event/bond combination in the time window from 31 to 90 days after default. The data set consists of transaction
data reported by TRACE for the period from July 2002 to October 2010 and amounts to approximately 1, 734, 000
trades with an aggregate volume of $500 billion covering 2, 235 default event/bond combinations. The default events
data were obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master
Default Database and cover bankruptcy filings, out-of-court restructurings, and downgrades to default status by
rating agencies representing payment defaults and unlikely-to-pay events. Bond characteristics and macroeconomic
data were retrieved from Bloomberg and the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, the firm fundamentals
from Compustat. Clustered standard errors at the default-event/firm level (see, e.g., Petersen, 2009) are given in
parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1.
Model (1. Nonfinancial) (2. Speculative-grade) (3. Alternative period)
Intercept 17.7210 26.5738∗∗ 8.2693
(14.3467) (13.4267) (11.9746)
Amount issued 0.0802 0.7805 −0.3090
(0.1817) (1.4907) (0.9779)
Maturity −1.0338∗∗∗ −1.0109∗∗∗ −0.5651∗∗∗
(0.1456) (0.1540) (0.0686)
Coupon 0.8776∗ 0.8604∗ 0.6193∗
(0.5096) (0.4624) (0.3221)
Rating −1.3604∗∗∗ −1.4200∗∗∗ −0.6355∗
(0.4760) (0.5058) (0.3045)
CDS availability 6.4090∗∗∗ 4.6294∗∗ 9.5436∗∗∗
(2.1291) (2.3320) (2.1993)
Investment covenant 3.0832 2.6558 2.5636
(3.0816) (2.4154) (1.9154)
Dividend covenant −0.2918 −1.2639 −2.9496
(2.3326) (2.4444) (2.2888)
Financing covenant 8.8260∗∗∗ 9.4359∗∗∗ 7.9240∗∗∗
(3.3200) (2.9599) (2.1733)
Event covenant −6.4800 −5.2612 −0.3426
(3.4527) (3.3698) (1.9737)
Equity 0.2133∗∗∗ 0.1765∗∗∗ 0.1109∗∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0499) (0.0406)
Default barrier −0.3074∗∗∗ −0.2586∗∗∗ −0.2303∗∗∗
(0.0662) (0.0623) (0.0737)
LTD issuance 0.0337 0.0247 −0.0014
(0.0299) (0.0295) (0.0253)
Intangibility −0.0315 −0.0177 −0.1476∗∗∗
(0.0489) (0.0451) (0.0506)
Receivables 0.2128∗∗ 0.1739∗ 0.2227∗∗∗
(0.1075) (0.0985) (0.0832)
Profitability −0.0708 −0.0657 −0.0043
(0.0627) (0.0551) (0.0476)
Total assets 1.8437 0.9190 3.8492∗∗
(1.4994) (1.1199) (1.7977)
Employees 0.5521∗∗ 0.4976∗∗∗ −0.1429
(0.2277) (0.1764) (0.1997)
Market default rate −4.0621∗∗∗ −4.4021∗∗∗ −3.7935∗∗∗
(1.4929) (1.4145) (1.2655)
Industry default rate −0.7298∗∗∗ −0.6808∗∗∗ −0.8425∗∗∗
(0.1931) (0.1893) (0.1244)
Federal Funds rate 9.1806∗∗∗ 7.6705∗∗∗ 4.9011∗∗∗
(1.7549) (1.5492) (1.5064)
Slope 10.4349∗∗∗ 8.5255∗∗∗ 6.8276∗∗∗
(1.9991) (1.6764) (1.7156)
Volume −0.4264 −0.2598 0.7466∗∗∗
(0.3652) (0.3420) 0.2537
Trades 0.0959 0.1424∗∗ 0.3490∗∗∗
(0.0689) (0.0612) (0.0763)
Amihud −0.3920 −0.6708 −0.8614∗∗∗
(0.4886) (0.4419) (0.1292)
Price dispersion −8.8340∗∗∗ −7.5300∗∗∗ −5.4874∗∗∗
(0.5500) (0.7200) (0.3840)
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.55 0.66
Observations 795 868 1, 780
Event dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Seniority dummies Yes Yes Yes
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